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ACCEPTANCE OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE AWARD
FOR LIFETIME ACHIEVEMENT
DISCLOSURE, DISINTERESTEDNESS, AND MCKINSEY
Jay Alix*
Well, it’s nice to be here, and I want to thank Judge Rhodes for that gracious
introduction. I’m honored to be here and share this evening with all your
honorees, faculty and Emory Law leaders. I also want to thank Matt Lindgren
and his team for their tremendous leadership in putting this program together. I
also want to recognize Keith Shapiro, who reminds me that we worked together
on many matters “back in the day.” He is a distinguished leader in the
restructuring industry, and I applaud all of his leadership contributions to both
Emory Law School and the restructuring industry.
I also want to recognize Dan Lemisch, Lisa Phillips and my other associates
who are here this evening. Thank you for coming.
I am honored to be chosen for the Distinguished Service Award. I’m proud
to say that I’ve been working in this honorable industry for over forty years.
Indeed, I’m proud to say that I’ve worked with, or taught with, over 75% of your
past twenty-one honorees. So this award, and all it represents, is very meaningful
to me.
You are the future leaders of the U.S. bankruptcy system. You are the people
who will have the responsibility to help keep our bankruptcy system vibrant,
strong and effective, and to maintain the high integrity and full transparency that
it is known for globally. We professionals are proud to work together in our
bankruptcy system while living up to the high fiduciary standard that the law
demands.
And so tonight, I want to share with you my story—the story about the fiveyear legal journey I’ve taken with Judge Rhodes, Dan Lemisch, Sean O’Shea,
Sheldon Toll, Lisa Phillips, and many other associates, researchers, and
bankruptcy professionals of integrity and distinction.

*
Jay Alix is the Founder of AlixPartners, a management consulting firm that focuses on complex
restructurings, turnaround management, and provides other consulting services. Mr. Alix retired from
AlixPartners in 2005, but he still sits on the Board of Directors for the firm and is a minority shareholder of the
firm. Mr. Alix received his undergraduate education from the Wharton School of Business at the University of
Pennsylvania and received his MBA in Accounting from Rutgers University.
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I retired from AlixPartners about fifteen years ago, but I’m still on the board
and a minority shareholder.
Since retiring, I’ve focused my time on some strong personal interests.
Producing Broadway plays and shows is one, and I’m very active in certain
philanthropies, dedicating my time, my skills, and my resources to a select group
of not-for-profits, most principally the Mayo Clinic. Another strong interest that
I have—well, I’ll get to that in a moment.
When I started out in the bankruptcy business in the late 1970s, we were
considered fringe players. People in the media said things like: they troll the
bottom; worked on the margins; they said we were the undertakers. And that’s
when they were being nice!
But today everyone knows the truth about what we do. Just within the last
year, The New York Times said:
[T]he bankruptcy system—what seems like a grim realm of
destitution—is actually a place for hope and opportunity. If the game
is played fairly, lenders can be predictably compensated; failing
businesses can be restructured and revived, and jobs can be saved.1

Our nation built our bankruptcy system for the benefit of all of us. It is a crucial
part of our nation’s economic system. And soon, you too will be an important
part of that system.
But while it’s important that people know what we do, it’s even more
important that people know how we do it. We professionals are charged with
making our bankruptcy system work. We are trusted fiduciaries and loyal
officers of the court, responsible to help the administration of justice. And we
have the fundamental duty to ensure that our bankruptcy system remains strong
for our country.
And so how do we fulfill that fundamental duty? We do it by adhering to the
strictest principles of integrity, honesty, and transparency—principles so
important that they are codified into the laws that apply to all professionals—
laws that for decades have worked effectively for the country, for the parties, for
the courts and for all of us.2

1
Mary Williams Walsh, One Man vs. McKinsey: A Billionaire Says the Consultancy Has Rigged the
Bankruptcy System, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11/business/jay-alix-mckinseybankruptcy.html.
2
See 11 U.S.C. § 327 (2019); id. § 101(14) (defining a “disinterested person”); see also John D. Ayer,
et al., Basics of Professional Retention and Compensation, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 1–5 (1995). Section 327(a) is
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And there are two very specific parts of bankruptcy law that impose this
fundamental duty that we’re talking about: disclosure and disinterestedness.
Disclosure is what it sounds like. It’s simple, just three words: Disclose All
Connections. It’s in Bankruptcy Rule 2014.3
And disinterestedness: That’s a hard word to say, but it too is a simple
concept that is precisely defined in the Bankruptcy Code.4 Simply put,
bankruptcy professionals are fiduciaries and can have no conflict of interest in
the case they’re working on. And, without question, this includes no hidden
investments, no hidden financial interests, no self-dealing, and no secret
engagements with secret undisclosed clients.5
Everybody in the industry knows that. Everyone here knows that. We cannot
fulfill our fiduciary duties to our debtor clients and to the courts (1) if we don’t
fully disclose our connections, or (2) if we’re not disinterested.
Often, to understand the full scope of something, I find it helpful to imagine
the alternative situation or opposite condition. So, let’s think about it this way:
What would happen if this system stops working in the way it’s supposed to
work? What would happen to our bankruptcy system if all professionals worked
without integrity and transparency—a system where the law does not apply to
all participants equally and where legal compliance is self-selected by each
participant?
What if the system malfunctions, not because of some systemic failure by
professionals generally, but for a much simpler reason: Because one very large
player decides for itself that it doesn’t have to abide by the same laws and rules
as everybody else and that it doesn’t have to comply with the law?

pertinent to professionals other than counsel:
[T]he trustee, with the court’s approval, may employ one or more attorneys, accountants,
appraisers, auctioneers, or other professional persons, that do not hold or represent an interest
adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to represent or assist the trustee in
carrying out the trustee’s duties under this title.
11 U.S.C. § 327(a) (emphasis added). Bankruptcy attorneys are subject to rules of professional conduct, both
those promulgated by their state bar and standards promulgated by the Federal Judicial Center. See MARIE
LEARY, STANDARDS GOVERNING ATTORNEY CONDUCT IN THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. 1–10
(1999).
3
The rule requires professionals to disclose “all of the person’s connections with the debtor, creditors,
any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and accountants, the United States trustee, or any person
employed by the office of the United States Trustee” to “the best of the applicant’s knowledge.” FED. R. BANKR.
P. 2014.
4
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(14).
5
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 2014.
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When that happens, the integrity of the entire system comes into question,
because stakeholders now know they can’t reasonably rely on the system. The
system is no longer consistent, predictable, and reliable. This kind of selfselected non-compliance not only exposes the system to dishonesty and deceit,
but it actually leads to full-on corruption in our federal court system.
OK, so what’s the problem? As we sit here tonight, we are indeed on a
journey down that path. But it’s not because the entire industry is doing this. No,
we’re not. Instead, what I discovered about six years ago is that one player is
deceptively leading us down this dangerous path. This one player decided for
itself that the law simply did not apply to it because it sees itself as unusual and
special, and this one player placed its own commercial interests above the law.
This one player is McKinsey Recovery and Transformation Services, also
known as McKinsey RTS. It is the wholly owned and controlled bankruptcy
affiliate of the global consulting firm McKinsey & Company.
McKinsey, which advises businesses and governments around the world,
cynically responds that it is confused - confused about its disclosure duties as a
professional. The New York Times said:
for years McKinsey has had a 57-page primer—titled “Bankruptcy
101”—that lays out how to identify possible conflicts and make proper
disclosures. The only problem: McKinsey hasn’t been following its
own instruction manual.6

I was shocked because Bankruptcy Rule 2014 is not confusing. It has functioned
exactly as it was designed to function: to ensure a professional’s full disclosure
of its connections to interested parties, and to allow the court to determine that
professional’s disinterestedness under sections 327 and 101(14).
Those provisions of the Bankruptcy Code make it illegal for a professional
to have either direct or indirect financial interests or adverse interests in the
bankruptcies they work on. Those rules have guided the disclosure of
connections by bankruptcy professionals for decades, and the case law is clear
and unambiguous, without exception.7 Those laws and rules work.

6
Mary Williams Walsh, McKinsey Said Disclosure Rules Were Confusing. It Ignored Its Own Primer.,
N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/business/mckinsey-bankruptcy-rules-jayalix.html.
7
See Ayer, et al., supra note 2.
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And they work because we professionals, collectively, have made them
work. We all participate in a self-reporting system; this system relies on a policy
and practice of self-reporting. All professionals are trusted to self-report.
Over the course of many months of careful study, I came to see that
McKinsey RTS was engaged in a stunning and coordinated attempt to conceal
its bankruptcy connections on a massive scale, not revealing its client and
investment connections, while playing a game of cat and mouse with its
bankruptcy disclosures. My first impulse and reaction was to contact
McKinsey’s CEO and advise him as I was convinced he couldn’t possibly know
this, and that he’d want to correct it. I wanted to help him. We met and spoke on
eleven occasions over fourteen months.8 He never stopped it or corrected it, even
though he promised to do so. Watching it continue into three more bankruptcy
case over those 14 months told me I had no choice but to report it all to the U.S.
Trustee. I’ve learned a lot more since then.
Through my expanded investigations, I learned that McKinsey RTS has
concealed over 5,000 client connections to interested parties in forty-four false
Rule 2014 declarations, filed in fourteen bankruptcies. We also now know that
McKinsey has over 300 undisclosed direct and indirect investments related to
these fourteen bankruptcy cases, again, all undisclosed. In contrast, most
professionals hope and pray they don’t miss even one connection in their Rule
2014 disclosures.
We know about those concealed connections because we have researched
McKinsey’s public SEC ADV forms and Department of Labor 5500 forms, both
documents filed annually, as well as multiple bankruptcy claims registers, court
dockets, debtor filings, and McKinsey’s own Rule 2014 declarations.
But further investigation shows McKinsey’s misconduct is much worse than
just concealing 5,000 client and investment connections. In its capacity as a
fiduciary advisor to large corporate chapter 11 debtors in fourteen major
bankruptcy cases, McKinsey has committed at least five categories of unlawful
conduct:
-

First, McKinsey advised its debtor clients in their negotiations with their
major creditors, creditors who were also McKinsey’s concealed clients.
In the Alpha Natural Resources (“ANR”) case, with McKinsey’s help,

8
See generally Michelle Celarier, The Man Who Would Take Down McKinsey, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR
(Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1dldlnb6wvx7f/The-Man-Who-Would-Take-DownMcKinsey (documenting the meeting that occurred and is discussed by Mr. Alix in his speech).
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ANR’s best assets were transferred to approximately forty senior
creditors, over thirty of whom were undisclosed active McKinsey
clients.9
Second, McKinsey RTS consultants were advising ANR on maximizing
its coal sales while, at the same time, the same team simultaneously
advised U.S. Steel on reducing its coal costs from ANR. It was all
concealed.10
Third, in multiple chapter 11 cases, McKinsey RTS has worked on the
sale of billions of dollars of debtor assets to other undisclosed McKinsey
clients. In the NII Holdings (formerly Nextel) bankruptcy case in New
York, McKinsey advised NII Holdings on the sale of Nextel Mexico to
AT&T for $1.8 billion. The problem was that the buyer, AT&T, was an
undisclosed McKinsey client at the same time McKinsey was advising
NII Holdings on the sale. McKinsey was on both sides of the transaction,
and no one knew it. And the same thing also happened in the Edison
Mission bankruptcy case in Chicago, and then it happened again in the
SunEdison case in New York. There were over $5.0 billion in asset
transfer transactions with multiple undisclosed McKinsey clients.11
Fourth, McKinsey helped arrange for the sale or transfer of debtors’
assets to entities in which McKinsey’s partners had either a direct or
indirect financial interest. In the ANR case, a hedge fund named
Whitebox purchased ANR debt during the bankruptcy case and ended
up owning a large part of the Newco/Contura equity stake that emerged
in the ANR case. McKinsey’s own partners, including those overseeing
RTS’s work, had known about the investment of McKinsey’s partners
in Whitebox for over 10 years. Yet, McKinsey’s connection to
Whitebox was never disclosed, and Whitebox, with millions in
McKinsey partners’ money, ended up as a major shareholder of the
Newco/Contura under the plan.12 The same type of transaction happened
in the NII Holdings case, along with similar undisclosed investments in
still five other bankruptcies.13 It’s a pattern.
Fifth, and this one really stands out for its chutzpah, in the SunEdison

9
The Alpha Natural Resources bankruptcy was widely covered in the media. See, e.g., Jacqueline
Palank, Judge Approves Alpha Natural Resources’ Restructuring Plan, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2016), https://www.
wsj.com/articles/judge-approves-alpha-natural-resources-restructuring-plan-1467920639.
10
See Linly Lin, McKinsey Faces Probe Over Conduct in Bankruptcy Cases, NYT Says, BLOOMBERG
NEWS (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-09/mckinsey-faces-probe-overconduct-in-bankruptcy-cases-nyt-says.
11
See id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
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case, McKinsey engaged in a fraudulent self-help financial manipulation
in the run-up to the bankruptcy filing. SunEdison was a McKinsey
client. Before it filed, SunEdison owed McKinsey millions of dollars.
Seeing that bankruptcy was imminent, McKinsey issued invoices and
then called them back and re-issued fraudulent invoices to SunEdison’s
non-debtor affiliates, and then used cash wire transfers and multiple
“round-trip” financial transactions to first cleanse and then
mischaracterize preference payments of $22 million, all to get
themselves paid.14
So, what does it mean? McKinsey first defrauded SunEdison’s creditors; and
then they defrauded the non-debtor affiliates; and then McKinsey defrauded the
court as well as the U.S. Trustee when it submitted multiple false Rule 2014
declarations stating that it was disinterested.
Here is the bottom line on McKinsey’s pattern of illegal conduct: Over the
course of the last five years, my multi-phase forensic fraud investigation and my
significant legal efforts to hold McKinsey accountable have demonstrated to me
and my team of bankruptcy experts that McKinsey RTS has engaged in a
calculated campaign of non-disclosure deception. McKinsey concealed client
and investment connections that were unquestionably disqualifying. Even
worse, McKinsey used the shroud of its nondisclosure to engage in a series of
profiteering and trafficking transactions in chapter 11 reorganizations that is
breathtaking in its brazenness.
McKinsey’s scheme involves the McKinsey Investment Office (the “MIO”)
which is a $26 billion hedge fund that is 100% owned and controlled by
McKinsey, overseen by McKinsey, governed by McKinsey, and has only
McKinsey partners’ and employees’ money in it. The evidence establishes that
McKinsey is actually a $26 billion hedge fund with a $10 billion consulting firm
connected to it.15
Our work in exposing McKinsey’s frauds on the various courts has had a big
impact and is bearing fruit. Just over a year ago, McKinsey entered into a
settlement with the creditors’ trust in the SunEdison case for $17.5 million, all

14
See Mary Williams Walsh & Emily Flitter, McKinsey Faces Criminal Inquiry Over Bankruptcy Case
Conduct, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/business/mckinsey-criminalinvestigation-bankruptcy.html.
15
See Michelle Celarier, The Story McKinsey Didn’t Want Written, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (July 8,
2019), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1g5zjdcr97k2y/The-Story-McKinsey-Didn-t-Want-Written.
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based on the very allegations we’ve raised. And it was our that work brought the
secret settlement to light.
Additionally, our work has brought about further accountability and penalty.
McKinsey recently made a record-setting $15 million settlement with the U.S.
Trustee,16 effectively admitting that it has a major disclosure problem in ANR,
SunEdison and Westmoreland Coal. The Department of Justice’s press release
regarding that settlement stated:
This settlement ensures that McKinsey is held accountable for its
conduct. . . Transparency is the linchpin of the bankruptcy system and
professionals employed in bankruptcy cases must be free of conflicts
of interest. McKinsey failed to satisfy its obligations under bankruptcy
law and demonstrated a lack of candor with the courts and USTP. This
settlement ensures that McKinsey is held to the same standards
applicable to all professionals who participate in bankruptcy cases. If
this conduct is repeated in future cases, we will seek even more farreaching remedies.17

McKinsey is unrepentant and continues to spin its excuses and publicly
states that it’s working under a new disclosure protocol, which McKinsey hopes
will wash away its past misdeeds. But this new protocol only perpetuates
McKinsey’s concealments of its connections, by allowing even more violations
of well-established case law under Rule 2014. The absurdity of that situation
was summed up quite nicely in a Wall Street Journal headline which said:
“McKinsey Broke the Rules; Now It Wants to Rewrite Them.”18
Like you, I’ve often asked myself: How has McKinsey been able to get away
with this? First, everyone has simply assumed McKinsey was both compliant
and honest. And second, for those who saw what McKinsey was doing,
McKinsey is like the 800-pound gorilla in the room, and nobody wants to tangle
with it. As the New York Times wrote “McKinsey Makes Its Own Rules.”19
McKinsey is so big and so well-connected that it scares people. No one
relished the idea of taking on the gorilla. But that has changed. Now McKinsey
16
See U.S. Trustee Program Reaches $15 Million Settlement with McKinsey & Company to Remedy
Inadequate Disclosures in Bankruptcy Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/us-trustee-program-reaches-15-million-settlement-mckinsey-company-remedy-inadequate.
17
Id. (quoting USTP Director Cliff White).
18
Gretchen Morgenson & Tom Corrigan, McKinsey Broke the Rules, Now It Wants to Rewrite Them,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mckinsey-broke-the-rules-now-it-wants-to-rewritethem-11555017761.
19
Ian MacDougall, How McKinsey Makes Its Own Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2019), https://www.
nytimes.com/2019/12/14/sunday-review/mckinsey-ice-buttigieg.html.

ALIX_11.30.20

2020]

11/30/2020 2:58 PM

ACCEPTANCE OF DISTINGUISHED SERVICE AWARD

xv

is under a comprehensive investigation by the U.S. Trustee Program, as well as
another separate investigation by the U.S. Attorney, according to both the New
York Times and the Wall Street Journal.20 And, McKinsey’s disclosures are
being challenged in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Houston.
And for the first time in all of McKinsey’s cases, it’s the Houston Court in
the Westmoreland case that is in a position to get to the truth and rule on the
merits. In the other cases, we were held up when McKinsey argued technical
issues of legal standing and other procedural technical defenses, but never has
any case been brought to trial or heard on the full merits, until now.
This story is bigger than me, and it’s bigger than McKinsey. It’s about
choices—the choices that McKinsey has made, and the choice that I made in
response. It’s about the same choice that every bankruptcy court and every
professional in the country makes. And it’s the same choice that each of you will
have to make on your journey.
What kind of bankruptcy process do we want to have for the people and
businesses of our country? Do we want one that follows the rule of law, one that
is a uniform bankruptcy system? Or do we want McKinsey’s concealed-conflicts
system, where core and fundamental principles like fiduciary duty, disclosure,
and disinterestedness are no more meaningful than a throwaway line in a
McKinsey PowerPoint slide?
I don’t think we want McKinsey’s system. It’s bad for our country’s
financial recovery system. It’s bad for our vibrant financial markets that
underpin our economy. It’s bad for the courts. And it’s bad for our industry. And
as you’ve seen, I’ve made my choice. And I’ve put my reputation on the line to
do what’s right—to report to the courts what I’ve learned—and not just for me
and my interests. But to do what’s right for the health and protection of our
system.
I choose to continue this important work by fighting for our values of
integrity, transparency, and honesty in the United States Bankruptcy Courts. I
choose to live up to what your important award to me tonight stands for, and
what Emory Law stands for. For me to be true to my values, there can be no
other choice.
Like all of us industry veterans, you too will work long and hard over the
course of your careers. You too will contribute to the development and integrity

20

See Walsh & Flitter, supra note 14; Morgenson & Corrigan, supra note 18.
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of the bankruptcy court system as well as our nation’s economic recovery
system. You’re next up. And you too will need to make your choice.
I ask you to join me and choose:
To use your strong and powerful voices to speak up;
To speak truth to McKinsey’s power;
To be a strong advocate to protect our bankruptcy system from dishonesty
and from self-serving and deceptive behavior;
To help protect our courts and the bankruptcy process from the repeated and
intentional illegal behavior by any offender of our bankruptcy laws;
And not to let anything corrupt these values or steal these principles from
you.
I hope that each of you will join me in that choice. Thank you very much.

